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Abstract:  Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium 
contributes to sentience in these fishes. He gives a detailed description of the pallium; however, he 
assumes that similar structures in fishes and tetrapods support similar behaviors, capabilities, and 
functions. I reject the premise that similarities in structure imply similarities in function. The fact that a 
selected species of fish may exhibit behaviors, reactions, and/or anatomy suggestive of sentience does not 
necessarily generalize to all teleosts. 
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Woodruff (2017) defends two theses in his target article. First, he concludes that ray-finned fishes 
(Actinopterygii) are sentient, and second, that the pallium contributes to sentience in these fishes. 
He rejects the argument that “… fishes lack the neuroanatomical substrates necessary for 
consciousness” (p. 2). To support this, he argues that the pallium found in fishes has reciprocal 
connections, which provide sensory input. He concludes that there is sufficient complexity to 
support sentience. He proceeds by discussing the neurophysiology of the pallium.  
Throughout this discussion, Woodruff makes many references to tetrapods and cites many 
papers to support his thesis. One of the problems with this work is that it uses different definitions 
of sentience and cognition (see Duncan 1996, 2006; Chandroo et al. 2004; Shettleworth 2001); 
thus, Woodruff rejects the statement of a given author who concludes that fishes are not sentient, 
but bases this rejection on a different definition of sentience.  
For example, Rose (2002) defines two types of consciousness. Higher order consciousness is 
an “awareness of one’s self as an entity that exists separately from other entities” (p. 4). Rose 
further states that fishes are capable of associative learning and preference/avoidance of certain 
stimuli. Such learning does not support a capacity for consciousness. Although Woodruff makes 
some compelling arguments that certain behaviors of fishes support sentience, he ignores the 
fact that responses of fishes to noxious stimuli have been observed even after the removal of the 
cerebral hemispheres (Rose 2002).  
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Woodruff (2017) further argues that selective attention is a “legitimate criterion for the 
presence of sentience” (p. 5). Johnston & Dark (1986) recognize internal selective attention, 
involving memory and knowledge, and external selective attention, which includes environmental 
objects and events. Again, Woodruff does not define his terms. Fishes certainly show preference 
and/or avoid certain conditions (e.g., thermal gradients – Stauffer et al. 1976), while experiencing 
many other external inputs (e.g., light, current, substrate). I doubt if this selective attention to 
external inputs can be a criterion for sentience. 
In Woodruff’s evaluation of the pallial anatomy, he concludes that “teleosts have the 
neuroanatomical complexity necessary to contribute to sentience” (p. 9). He compares this 
complexity to that of mammals and assumes that structure equals function, which is not always 
true. For example, that fishes produce the enzyme lactase (Gawlicka et al. 1995) does not mean 
that they feed on milk. He continues by stating that because fishes exhibit generalized 
electrophysiological responses that are correlated with criteria of sentience in mammals, this 
further supports sentience in teleosts. Throughout the article, Woodruff supposes that since fish 
have structures and behaviors similar to those found in mammals, they must be sentient. In my 
view, that fishes can remember does not mean that they are sentient.  
In conclusion, I do not deny that fishes may exhibit certain behaviors that may be construed 
as sentient (i.e., the social learning of species of archer fish, Toxotidae, Schuster et al. 2006). I do, 
however, reject the premise that similarities in structure imply similarities in function. Finally, the 
fact that some species of fish may exhibit behaviors, reactions, and/or anatomy that suggest 
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